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Abstract 
Past studies examined the impact of open market repurchase announcements on bond and 
stock prices and identified its main causes, such as signaling, free cash flow, and wealth 
redistribution. Building on the work by Maxwell and Stephens (2003), we introduce daily 
bond return data to analyze abnormal bond and stock returns around share repurchase 
announcements and examine these hypotheses. We find a strong wealth transfer effect, as 
well as some evidence of undervaluation signaling. The wealth gain or loss of 
bondholders is a function of the size of the repurchase program, the leverage ratio, and 
the book-to-market ratio.  
Keywords: Repurchase Announcement; bondholders; Wealth Transfer  
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I. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of announcements of U.S. open market share 
repurchase programs on bond and stock prices. Although the impact on stock prices has 
received considerable attention, the impact on bond prices has been overlooked, with the 
exception of the Maxwell and Stephens (2003) study. The research of bond price 
response to repurchase announcements is important for several reasons. First of all, the 
impact of announcements on just one security class, common stock, provides an 
incomplete picture of how stock repurchases affect the firm. In addition, possible wealth 
transfers between different security classes, such as bond and stock, can be studied using 
stock and bond reaction to stock repurchase announcements. 
Corporate finance theory has studied agency conflicts between various security 
classes. Managers’ decisions, such as dividend payout and share repurchases, often profit 
one class and harm another. Stock buy-backs obviously benefit shareholders because they 
raise the stock price and EPS. Since a portion of firms’ free cash flow is used to 
repurchase stock, the money available to cover interest payments to the bondholders is 
reduced, which means default risk on bonds increases and can cause bond prices to drop. 
This suggests that stock repurchases can lead to a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders in a firm. 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) is the only research paper that studies the impact of 
repurchase announcements on bond prices. We use it as our guide with modifications of 
data sample and variable testing. The contribution of this research paper is our use of 
daily bond returns instead of monthly bond returns used by Maxwell and Stephens 
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(2003).
1
 We find that the bond market does not react as quickly as the stock market and 
that the immediate bond price reaction is more complex than the results in Maxwell and 
Stephens (2003) for monthly bond returns; for example, we find different signs of 
reactions for one-day and two-day post-announcement bond returns. Besides, we also 
find a phenomenon of a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders when the stock 
return is negative and the bond return is positive for approximately half of the sample. 
We find negative abnormal bond returns on the announcement days of open 
market share repurchase program. Consistent with prior studies, we find positive 
abnormal stock returns during the three-day repurchase announcements period. Also, we 
find a negative correlation between bond and stock value changes on the announcements 
day which can be explained by the wealth transfer hypothesis. For the two-day period, 
which includes the announcement day and the day after, abnormal bond return is less 
negative than one-day abnormal bond return. Since many repurchase programs can be 
announced after-trading hours, this insignificant abnormal bond return on the first trading 
day following the announcement is puzzling. In addition, small repurchases have a 
negative impact on abnormal bond return. The abnormal bond price reaction is negative 
for firms with high market leverage and positive for small leverage ratio firms. In contrast, 
abnormal stock return is positive regardless of the repurchase size or leverage ratio. 
Besides, we find stock returns are greater for large repurchase size as well as large market 
leverage. 
                                                     
1
 Daily bond price data has become available since 2002, after the publication of Maxwell and Stephens’s 
paper. 
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The outline of the paper is as following: Section II provides general literature 
review. In Section III, we describe the data we use and our sample, as well as the 
methodology we use to test our data. Our empirical results are provided in Section IV. 
Section V is our conclusion. 
II. Literature Review 
Besides stock repurchase announcements, numerous corporate events influence 
bond prices. Dividend announcements, for example, influence bond prices in a 
contradictory way because of the following two hypotheses. The information content 
hypothesis predicts a positive bond price reaction to a dividend increase due to signaling, 
but the wealth redistribution hypothesis implies negative bond price response (Dhillon 
and Johnson, 1994; Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984). Warga and Welch (1993) study the 
impact of leveraged buyout (LBO) on bond price with data from 1985 to 1989. They find 
that LBO announcements cause bondholder wealth loss. Elliott, Prevost and Rao (2009) 
examine the influences of seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements on 
bondholders and find positive bond returns. Adams and Mansi (2009) study the impact of 
CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth and find a negative relationship 
between them.  
Share repurchases have become a common way of cash distribution to 
shareholders for corporations. From 1980 to 2000, share repurchase programs grew at an 
average rate of 26.1% (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). For example, open market share 
repurchase programs totaled only $16 billion in 1985; but in 1998, the announcement 
value was approximately $216 billion (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003). Compared to 
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dividend payouts, share repurchases are more flexible in order to respond to investment 
opportunities (Rasbrant, 2011). Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) believe that stock buy-back 
program will still be an important form of cash payout. Grullon and Michaely (2002) find 
“firms have gradually substituted repurchases for dividends.”  
The corporate decision to repurchase shares can have several reasons. Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) provide a list of motivations, such as “capital structure 
adjustment, takeover defense, signaling, excess cash distribution, substitution for cash 
dividends, and wealth expropriation from bondholders”. The one that is widely discussed 
and most accepted by prior researchers is signal of stock undervaluation. A share 
repurchase announcement signals a firm’s willingness to invest in itself due to the firm’s 
undervaluation (Rasbrant, 2011; Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995; 
Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Netter and Mitchell, 1989). Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000) prove that share repurchases rise when stock prices drop. Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) support the undervaluation theory with their finding that actual “repurchases in 
one quarter are negatively related to the performance of the firm’s stock in the prior 
quarter, as well as to the cumulative return on the firm’s stock since the announcements 
of the program” (p. 314). Rasbrant (2011) explains in his study that managers would buy-
back shares when they notice the stock price below its “real” value, so a share repurchase 
announcement is a positive signal to the market. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) consider 
managers using “repurchases to ‘signal’ their optimism about the firm’s prospect to the 
firm” (p. 35). One explanation is that the managers expect the firm’s future cash flows 
will increase. Another thought is that the managers do not agree with the current market 
price based on the firm’s performance. (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000) 
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A stock buy-back is not only a substitution of cash dividend, but also more 
flexible method of cash distribution because it is not a commitment of a future payment. 
Compared to dividend payout which represents ongoing commitment and used by firms 
with higher continuous operating cash flow, share repurchases are often used by firms 
having high temporary non-operating cash flow (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 
1995; Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000). 
Since repurchase announcements signal undervaluation of the company, “the 
stock price rises when this information is revealed” (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). 
Rasbrant (2011) find 3% abnormal stock return surrounding the open market share 
repurchase announcements. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find four-year 
12.1% average stock buy-and-hold abnormal return after initial share repurchase 
announcements.  
III. Data 
In this section, we discuss the sources of repurchase announcements and bond 
data, the derivation of the final sample, and the characteristics of our data sample. 
A. Data Selection 
We utilize a sample of open market share repurchase from July 1, 2002 to 
December 31, 2008, from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. The SDC 
database has the most comprehensive source of data on share repurchase programs and 
announcements that are reported in a number of business media sources. Following 
Babenko et al (2011), we delete the announcements which are duplicated by the SDC and 
have little modification for the multiple repurchase announcements by a firm within a 
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month. Besides, we only keep the firms trading at stock prices no lower than $1 to avoid 
microstructure effects in returns. The program size is reported as the dollar value of 
shares in the repurchase divided by the firm’s market value at the beginning of the fiscal 
year, as 98% of announcing firms reported the dollar value of repurchases while less than 
80% did not report the percentage of outstanding shares sought.  
For the stock abnormal return for the announcing companies, we use the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as the sum of the differences between the observed 
stock returns and the returns predicted by the market model for the three trading days [-
1,1] centered on the announcement.  The parameters of the market model are estimated 
by the value-weighted CRSP index within the estimation window (-252, -44) relative to 
the announcements. This method has been widely used in the stock repurchase literature 
(e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1991), Kahle (2002), and Maxwell and Stephens (2003)). We 
choose three-day abnormal stock returns rather than one-day or two-day returns because 
of following reasons. First of all, the stock market reacts very quickly and frequently to 
news. In addition, since repurchase announcements are not material non-public 
information, some information leakages happen possibly one day before. As a result, 
three-day stock returns could show the overall reaction of stock market to the share 
repurchase announcement.  
B. Bond Returns 
Our primary source of bond data is Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE), which  is the FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) developed 
vehicle that reports the over-the-counter secondary market transactions in eligible fixed 
income securities, with the transaction recorded by all broker/dealers who are FINRA 
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members mandatorily. Often the accurate bond pricing data are difficult to find; but this 
bond data could reflect the market value of each bonds. However, the bond market does 
not trade as frequently as the stock market; thus the reaction should be slower. Therefore, 
the one-day and two-day bond return should be more accurate than three-day bond return 
and a three-day window around the announcements is not necessary for bonds. In order to 
calculate the abnormal return of bonds, we also use the treasury data from TRACE.  
From the sample of 4964 open market share repurchase announcements from 
2002 to 2012, we find bond data of 438 announcements, which is 9% of the sample) 
covering 1,002 bonds outstanding. According to Bessembinder et al (2008), there are 
mainly three ways to construct daily returns from the TRACE data. One is simply 
utilizing the price of the last trade. Another way is weighting each trade by its size, which 
is referred as the “trade-weighted price, all trades” approach. The best method to select 
bond price data is weighing each trade by size and eliminating small trades, which called 
the “trade-weighted price, trade≥100k” method. However, we do not have the value of 
bond trades data because the amounts for large trades are not provided in the TRACE 
database. Since we lack the data for trade size, we use a simple approach using TRACE 
data, which is constructing the daily bond returns based on the price of the last trade of 
the day.   
In order to calculate abnormal bond and stock returns around the repurchase 
announcements, we use standard event study methodologies. Following Bessembinder et 
al (2008) and Maxwell and Stephens (2003), we use the mean adjusted model to calculate 
the daily abnormal returns. The mean-adjusted model was introduced by Handjinicolaou 
and Kalay (1984) to account for term structure change. It is the most frequently used 
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method of calculating abnormal bond return. In the mean-adjusted return model, the 
abnormal bond return is calculated in two steps: first, we calculate the premium holding 
period return (PBR) for bond i during period t, that is, using the bond’s return (BR) minus 
the matching Treasury return (TR) [a. Treasury bonds with matching maturity are used 
for the adjustment. Those treasury bonds with the closest maturity are chosen: 
             
The mean expected excess return (EBR) for bond i in the announcement day is 
equal to the average PBR for bond i for the previous y days:  
              
  
    
 
 
 
After calculating the expected return, the abnormal bond returns (ABR) for bond i 
are calculated as: 
               
While the majority of firms in the sample have a single bond outstanding, there 
are still a number of firms that have multiple bonds. According to Bessembinder et al 
(2008), there are several methods to deal with this issue. First, we could treat each bond 
as a separate observation (denoted as the all-bond sample). However, this method 
neglects the impact of the likely high correlation between returns of bonds issued by the 
same firm; so it would inflate the t-statistics and overweigh firms with multiple issues in 
the sample.  
Earlier researchers also pick representative bond for each firm in the sample 
(denoted as the Representative Bond Approach), but this approach is unlikely to capture 
the debt value change of the company due to different attributes in different bonds. 
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Another approach is to treat each firm as a single observation and calculate the abnormal 
return of bondholders in a firm as the weighted-average abnormal return to the different 
bond issues. This method will overestimate the standard error because the bonds in firms 
are not perfectly correlated but it can generally reflect the debt value change of a firm. 
However, since we do not have the amounts of bond trades data, we cannot calculate the 
weighted-average abnormal return for firms. Instead, we use the equally-weighted 
average return to the different bonds issued by the same firm as the abnormal return of 
bondholders in a firm. 
C. Summary Statistics  
Table II presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our study. The 
mean equally-weighted three-day CAR (cumulative abnormal return) for stock around the 
announcement date is 0.899%, which is statistically significant at 1% level, supporting the 
assumption that stock return should have a positive reaction to the open market repurchase 
announcement. The reason why we use equal-weighting to calculate averages is based on 
Loughran and Ritter (2000), who argue that weighting firms equally is better to detect 
abnormal returns than tests that underweighting small cap companies. For all bonds 
sample, the average one day abnormal return (the return for announcement day) is -7.316% 
and the average three day (the [-1,1] day cumulative return around the announcement day) 
abnormal return is 6.575%, both statistically different from zero with 99% and 90% 
confidence level respectively. This result indicates that the bonds have a large negative 
immediate reaction to the repurchase announcement. However for the three-day return, 
the result is a large positive return. Our explanation is that the bond market does not react 
as quickly and as frequently as the stock market.  The bond price run-up (the excess return 
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during the [-31, -3] days prior to the announcement) has a mean of -2.72%, which is 
statistically significant and indicates that the whole bond market lacks confidence before 
the repurchase announcement. For firm data, we get 2.96% and 3.55% for one day return 
and three-day bond AR averaged by firm, but they are not statistically significant. In 
addition, we have the mean of market leverage of 25.3%, 0.44% of the book to market 
ratio, and 0.26 of the daily stock return volatility. Finally, in Table 2 it also shows that the 
average repurchase is 6.66% of the firm’s market value.  
D. Predicted Returns with Signaling and Wealth Transfer Effects 
Following Maxwell and Stephens (2003), table I shows the outcome of the past studies 
about the wealth transfer effect and signaling effect of repurchase announcements. On 
average, stock prices increase around the announcement of a share repurchase program. If 
there is a signaling effect, bond prices will generally increase; conversely, the wealth 
transfer hypothesis indicates the wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders, thus 
the bond price drops at the same time as the stock price rises. In addition the table in 
Maxwell and Stephens, we add one more combination of positive bond returns and 
negative stock returns, which is the outcome of wealth transferring from shareholders to 
bondholders. It can arise if a repurchase announcement signals a lack of investment 
opportunities, which leads to a negative stock price reaction. Simultaneously, the 
announcement signals relatively less investment into new risky projects, which results in 
positive bond returns. 
 
14 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Full Sample 
Table III lists the abnormal bond returns of all bond samples as individual 
observations and all bond samples averaged by firm for the announcements day, the day 
before and after as well as two-day and three-day announcements period. 
On the announcement days, the mean of abnormal bond return for all bond 
samples is -7.316%, which is statistically significant with 99% confidence level. It 
indicates that repurchase announcements has large negative impact on bond abnormal 
return on announcement days because share buy-backs increase firms’ default risk 
therefore shrink bondholders’ wealth. Although the median is 0.227%, since it is not 
significant, it has no difference from zero.  
Conversely, the mean and median of abnormal bond returns for all bond samples 
averaged by firm on the announcement days is 2.958% and 3.777% respectively. As these 
two numbers are both not significant, they are no difference from zero. An alternative 
explanation is that returns are more negative for firms that have many bonds. When we 
average the sample bond returns by firms, the large negative number for individual bonds 
becomes much smaller in absolute terms; thus the mean of abnormal bond returns for the 
bond samples averaged by firm becomes positive, though insignificant. This explanation 
is consistent with bond returns sorted by leverage ratios in table V, where firms with a 
higher leverage ratio have more negative returns since these firms tend to have relatively 
more bonds outstanding. 
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On the day after the announcements, the mean of the abnormal bond returns for 
all bond samples is 2.807% without significance. The positive number implies bond 
prices increase on the next day, which is consistent with the results from table IV even 
though the number here is not significant.  
The two-day abnormal bond returns are not consistent with one-day returns. 
However, since their mean and median are not statistically significant, they are no 
difference than zero. 
For the three-day bond returns measure, the average and median of both abnormal 
bond and stock returns are positive and statistically significant. The likely explanation is 
that the share repurchase announcements send positive signal not only to shareholders but 
also to bondholders. Further, the three-day abnormal bond returns is positive while one-
day abnormal bond returns is negative because the abnormal bond return on the day 
before announcement is positive, and available data is more limited for three-day returns 
than one-day returns. 
B. Bond Returns Segmented by Positive or Negative Equity Returns 
In table IV, we segment abnormal bond returns by positive and negative changes 
in equity returns over the three days around the announcements in order to test the wealth 
transfer hypothesis (whether there is a negative correlation between bond returns and 
stock returns). 
On the announcement days, mean and median of abnormal bond return is -18.762% 
and -3.875%, respectively, significant at 1% level for the firms with positive changes in 
equity value. These two numbers reveal that bond prices drop dramatically on the same 
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day of announcements, which is an intense first reaction after announcements. The 
negative correlation between bond and stock value changes is consistent with the 
hypothesis of wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders because repurchases 
make the firm less cash flow which can be used to pay back to bondholder. The two-day 
period, which includes announcement days and the one day after, has statistically 
significant mean with 95% confidence level. The mean of the two-day abnormal returns 
is -7.610%, which is less negative than the mean of the one-day abnormal returns. 
Accordingly, the mean of abnormal bond returns on the day after announcements has to 
be positive. The bond prices increase while stock prices rise can be caused by the positive 
signal of firms’ future performance from bondholders’ perspective after their overnight 
re-thinking. 
For the firms with negative changes in equity value, the situation is opposite. The 
mean and median of abnormal bond returns on the announcement days is 17.217% and 
10.163%. On the first two days, the mean and median is 21.613% and 16.476% 
respectively. All these numbers are statistically significant with 99% confidence level. 
The four numbers demonstrate the bond prices rise on both days. On the one hand this 
result is simply evidence of negative correlation between stock and bond announcements 
returns. Maxwell and Stephens (2003) consider negative stock returns only as an 
indication of a negative signal about firm value, and their framework does not 
accommodate for a combination of positive bond returns and negative stock returns. In 
order to explain what appears to be a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders, 
we need to consider other motives for stock repurchases that could result in a negative 
stock reaction. A plausible explanation is that the firm announcing its repurchase plans 
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signals a lack of investment opportunities, which leads to a negative stock price reaction. 
At the same time, this implies the firm is planning to make relatively less investment into 
new risky projects. As a result, this action reduces volatility of the firm's cash flows and 
overall risk, which positively affect bond prices, revealed in the positive bond 
announcements returns we find. Effectively, such announcements trigger a wealth 
transfer from shareholders to bondholders. 
We also calculate the differences in mean and median bond returns between firms 
that experience positive and negative changes in their equity values. The results, which 
are mean difference -35.979% and median -14.038%, are both statistically significant at 1% 
level. The large negative numbers imply that the impact of the positive and negative 
changes in equity value has huge impact on bond returns. 
In the remaining three columns of table IV, we do the same tests for bond returns 
averaged within each firm. While the mean of abnormal bond return for the firms with 
negative changes in equity value averaged by firm on the announcements day is 7.878%, 
which is consistent with all bond samples of the firms with negative changes in equity 
value, the means of abnormal bond returns of the firms with positive changes in equity 
value are not. For the two-day and three-day period, means are positive but not 
statistically significant. The same lack of significance is observed for two and three day 
returns in the other subsample. The differences between subsamples are not statistically 
significant when returns are averaged by firm. 
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C. Bond and Stock Returns Segmented by Repurchase Size 
In table V, we report the abnormal bond and stock returns when the sample is 
segmented by repurchase size. In order to find the determinant of the “large” repurchase 
program, we calculate the median program size in the full sample, which is 5.7%. Any 
repurchase program that is greater than 5.7% is categorized as a large repurchase, and the 
rest are small repurchases. 
The mean of abnormal bond returns for all bond samples on the announcements 
day is -12.270% with statistically significant at 1% for the small repurchases. This 
negative abnormal bond return is a negative wealth effect on bondholders. We calculate 
the difference between the large and small repurchases by subtracting the mean for small 
repurchases from large repurchases. The result 12.707%, which is statistically significant 
at 99% confidence level, indicates that the influence of large and small repurchases has 
big difference. 
The average three-day abnormal stock returns for large repurchases is 1.116% 
with statistical significance at 1% level, and that for small repurchases is 0.687% with 
significance at 5% level. From these two numbers, we can conclude that repurchase 
announcements have positive impact on stock returns. Moreover, same as Maxwell and 
Stephens (2003) express in their research paper, stock returns are greater for large 
repurchases. 
D. Bond and Stock Returns Segmented by Leverage Ratio 
We also report abnormal bond and stock returns segmented by leverage ratio in 
table V. Firms with the leverage ratio greater than 14.45% are considered as those with 
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large market leverage, and the remaining firms belong to the small market leverage 
category. 
For all bond samples observed as individuals on the announcement  days, the 
mean for large market leverage is -10.808% with statistical significance at 1% level and 
for small leverage ratio is 8.415% with significance at 5% level. From bondholders’ 
perspective, the firms are risky because of high leverage ratio, and repurchases leave the 
firm with even less free cash flow to pay back to bondholders, so the bond price fall more 
than ten percent. On the other hand, for the firms with low leverage ratio, bondholders 
feel that share buy-backs have less risk than investment in risky projects, thus the bond 
prices increase. 
The three-day abnormal stock returns during the announcements period are 
statistically significant for both samples. For larger market leverage ratio the mean is 
1.046% and for small market leverage the average is 0.589%. As a result, market 
leverage ratio impacts on stock returns positively with the trend of the larger the ratio, the 
higher the stock return. 
E. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Bond Return 
In order to examine relationship between abnormal bond and stock returns and 
some independent variables that may affect abnormal returns, we run cross-sectional 
regression with and without clustering by announcement year and provide our results in 
table VI. Our dependent variables are one-day, two-day, and three-day abnormal bond 
returns in Panels A, B, and C. Panel D regresses one and three-day abnormal returns 
averaged by firm. Our independent variables include firm size, which is the log of firm’s 
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market value, three-day announcement stock returns, repurchase size, indicator variable 
for a large repurchase, market leverage, volatility of stock return, and book-to-market 
value.  
In panel A and B, almost all of the values of the independent variable, book-to-
market value, are statistically significant for one-day and two-day abnormal bond returns. 
But models do not explain variance in returns since the adjusted R
2
 values are small. 
With clustering by announcements year, the cross-sectional regressions between two-day 
abnormal bond returns and some independent variables demonstrate in model eight of 
Panel B. Both stock returns and book-to-market ratios are statistically significant at 10% 
level. Consistent with prior results, stock returns negatively correlated with abnormal 
bond return, which is also consistent with wealth transfer hypothesis. The positive 
correlation between the book-to-market ratio and the abnormal bond returns can be 
explained by signal of firm undervaluation and positive signal of future performance.  
V. Conclusion 
There are two main theories of the impact on stock repurchase announcements: 
the wealth transfer effect and signaling effect. The wealth transfer theory suggests that 
share repurchases distribute cash to shareholders; thus reducing the cash flow available to 
cover the interest and principle payment for bondholders, which may lead to a higher 
probability of default on the bonds and a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders. Therefore, stock repurchases may have negative impact on bond prices. 
However, the signaling theory suggests that the manager of the firms repurchase shares to 
signal current stock prices or firm values are undervalued by the market. In this case, both 
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stockholders and bondholders will benefit from repurchase announcements and thus both 
stock and bond prices should have positive reaction on share repurchases. However, 
under these two theories, there is also an assumption that the firm will really buy-back the 
shares. If the firm is assumed to do repurchase action in the future, the wealth transfer 
effect should be stronger. This is because if the firm is not expected to do real repurchase 
action in the future, there will be no real wealth redistribution effect and the 
announcement means that the firm is only informing the public that the stock price is 
undervalued.  
We examine a large sample of repurchase announcements made by firms with 
publicly traded bonds for which bond price information is available in the TRACE 
Database. During the announcement period, we find abnormal positive stock returns and 
negative bond returns (on the announcement day). The negative effect on the 
announcement day is very intense, but it tends to temper on the next day, which may be 
due to 33% fewer observations of the two-day return data samples. The sign of the two-
day return is relatively weak. Overall, the wealth transfer effect is obvious in our sample. 
To further understand the relation between the signaling and wealth transfer 
hypotheses, we segment the samples into positive and negative stock return firms. For the 
positive stock return firms, we find statistically significant negative bond returns on the 
announcing day and the day after. This result is consistent with wealth transfer theory. 
However, when it turns to negative stock return firm, we also find statistically significant 
positive bond returns on the announcing day and the day after. A plausible explanation is 
that these firms are relatively less risky but lack of investment opportunity so they choose 
repurchase, which is a relatively secured way for investment, thus resulting a reduced 
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volatility for firm’s cash flow. Such risk reduction is known to positively effect on bond 
price. As a result, such announcement triggers a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
bondholders. 
In explaining the returns, the bond returns are negative for smaller repurchase 
programs, which is different from the result of Maxwell and Stephens (2003). The 
explanation is that smaller repurchase are often continuous over years therefore more 
likely to be completed. Besides, the bond returns are negative for firms with high market 
leverage and positive for firms with low leverage rate, which can account for the theory 
that the riskier the firm, the larger the negative impact on bond prices.  
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Tables 
Table I Predicted Returns for Repurchases with Both Signaling and Wealth Transfer Effects 
This table shows the possible outcomes for repurchases with both signaling and wealth transfer effects by using positive and negative signs. Since 
signaling and wealth transfer effects together may lead to different outcome, we represent the ambiguity of the outcome with "uncertain". 
 
  
Abnormal Bond 
Return  
Abnormal Stock 
Return  
Abnormal Firm 
Return 
Correlation between 
Changes in Stock and 
bond Values 
  
    
Pure wealth transfer to shareholder - + 0 - 
     
Pure wealth transfer to bondholder + - 0 - 
  
    Positive signal and no wealth transfer to shareholder + + + + 
  
    Negative signal and no wealth transfer to shareholder - - - + 
  
    Positive signal and wealth transfer to shareholder uncertain + + uncertain 
  
    Negative signal and wealth transfer to shareholder - uncertain - uncertain 
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Table II Summary Statistics 
Announcement day is assumed to be day 0. Three-day stock CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return of [-1, 1] trading day around the 
announcement day, calculated by using the market model with the value-weighted CRSP index, where the parameters of the market model are 
estimated over a period of [-252,-44] day of the trading day.  The bond AR is the abnormal bond return calculated using a mean-adjusted return 
model accounting for changes in the term structure which is introduced in the empirical method part. Three-day bond CAR is the cumulative 
abnormal bond return for [-1, 1] day around the announcement. One day bond AR average by firm and three-day AR average by firm is the 
average return of the one day and three-day bond abnormal returns for bonds in the same firm. Bond price run-up is the average return in the [-31, 
-3] day. The repurchase size is calculated by the dollar value of the repurchase divided by the market value of firm equity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. The book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value to market value of a firm's equity.  Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns measured over one year prior to the announcement. Market leverage is the ratio of total debt value to the market value of equity. The last 
column reports t-test statistics of a two-sided test for zero mean. The 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent confidence levels are denoted by ***, 
** and * respectively. 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
p-value of t-test 
One-day Bond AR(%) 1458 -7.316 0.227 77.830 0.000*** 
Three-day Bond CAR(%) 680 6.575 10.018 89.990 0.057* 
Bond price run-up (EBR) 1458 -2.724 -2.191 20.640 0.000*** 
One-day Bond AR(%) Average by Firm 438 2.958 3.778 59.700 0.300 
Three-day Bond CAR(%) Average by Firm 268 3.545 1.358 96.914 0.550 
Three-day Stock CAR(%)  438 0.899 0.748 4.168 0.000*** 
Repurchase Size(%) 438 6.658 5.691 4.804 
  Market Value(log) 440 9.458 9.516 1.433 
 Market Leverage(%) 439 25.298 20.848 17.055 
 Book-to-market Equity Ratio 440 0.437 0.410 0.249 
 Stock Return Volatility 438 0.257 0.233 0.117 
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Table III Abnormal Bond Returns 
This table uses the full sample of bond returns and presents the comparison of bond abnormal returns for the day before announcement (day -1), 
the day of announcement (day 0), the day after announcement (day 1), two-day return (day [0,1]), and three-day return (day [-1,1).  Also, this table 
presents the comparison of bond abnormal returns average by firms for the day before announcement, the day of announcement, the day after 
announcement, and two-day return (day [0,1]) and three-day return (day [-1,1]). All returns are expressed in percent and the p-values are in 
parentheses. The 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent confidence levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. (n = number of observations) 
Description 
Abnormal Bond Return -- All-Bond Sample Abnormal Bond Return -- Average by Firm 
day [-1]  day [0] day [1] day [0, 1]  day [-1, 1]  day [-1] day [0] day [1] day [0, 1] day [-1, 1] 
  
     
  
    Number of  Firms n = 898 n = 1458 n = 954 n = 898 n = 680 n = 326 n = 438 n = 338 n = 326 n = 268 
  
     
  
    Mean 7.455*** -7.316*** 2.807 2.059 6.575* 1.484 2.958 -1.024 5.192 3.545 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.509) (0.057) (0.640) (0.300) (0.732) (0.267) (0.550) 
  
     
  
    Median 7.148*** 0.227 -1.681 6.080 10.018** -0.638 3.777 -1.392 0.099 1.358 
p-value (0.000) (0.105) (0.382) (0.355) (0.012) (0.971) (0.277) (0.982) (0.495) (0.509) 
           
28 
 
 
Table IV Difference in Abnormal Bond Returns Segmented by Positive or Negative Equity Returns 
This table documents abnormal bond returns (one day return, two-day return and three-day return) segmented by the change in equity value during 
the three days around the repurchase announcement. All returns are expressed in percent and the p-values are in parentheses. We report the mean 
and the median returns. The 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent confidence levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. (n = number of 
observations) 
Description 
Abnormal Bond Return -- All-Bond Sample  Abnormal Bond Return -- Average by Firm 
day [0] day [0, 1] day [-1, 1] day [0] day [0, 1] day [-1, 1] 
Firms with positive changes in equity value n = 984 n = 584 n = 437 n = 263 n = 199 n = 161 
Mean -18.762*** -7.610** 2.063 -0.029 1.885 3.612 
p-value (0.000) (0.026) (0.580) (0.994) (0.743) (0.599) 
Median -3.875*** 3.711 4.300 3.831 -1.532 -1.613 
p-value (0.000) (0.218) (0.344) (0.681) (0.910) (0.678) 
Firms with negative changes in equity value n = 467 n = 308 n = 237 n = 173 n = 125 n = 105 
Mean 17.217*** 21.613*** 17.315** 7.878* 11.275 4.817 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.076) (0.163) (0.658) 
Median 10.163*** 16.476*** 18.724*** 4.943 4.775 10.397 
p-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.160) (0.178) (0.472) 
Firms with positive - Firms with negative 
changes in equity value 
   
  
  Mean -35.979*** -29.223*** -15.252* -7.907 -9.390 -1.205 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.177) (0.331) (0.925) 
Median -14.038*** -12.765* -14.424*** -1.112 -6.307 -12.010 
p-value (0.000) (0.091) (0.003) (0.922) (0.569) (0.531) 
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Table V Abnormal Bond and Stock Returns segmented by repurchase size and leverage  
This table documents the abnormal bond (one day and three-day) and stock return segmented by the size of the repurchase and the level of firm's 
leverage ratio. The differences in segment returns are then tested. The sample is segmented into firms at or below the median of repurchase 
program size of 5.7 percent and those above the median repurchase of 5.7 percent. Also, the sample is segmented into firms with large and small 
leverage relative to the median market leverage ratio of 14.45 percent. All returns are expressed in percentages and p-values are in parentheses. 
The 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent confidence levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. (n = number of observations) 
Description 
Bond Return -- All-Bond Sample  Bond Return -- Average by Firm Stock Return  
day [0] day [0, 1] day [-1, 1] day [0] day [0, 1] day [-1, 1] day [-1, 1] 
Large repurchases  n = 584 n = 391 n = 280 n = 218 n = 173 n = 129 n = 218 
Mean 0.437 4.206 0.582 2.222 3.130 -1.924 1.116*** 
p-value (0.869) (0.301) (0.917) (0.596) (0.626) (0.820) (0.000) 
Small repurchases n = 871 n = 561 n = 400 n = 218 n = 163 n = 139 n = 218 
Mean -12.270*** -3.583 10.770** 4.369 1.071 8.621 0.687** 
p-value (0.000) (0.236) (0.014) (0.262) (0.865) (0.301) (0.021) 
Large repurchases - Small repurchases 
   
  
  
  
Mean 12.707*** 7.789 -10.188 -2.147 2.059 -10.545 0.429 
p-value (0.001) (0.124) (0.146) (0.707) (0.819) (0.375) (0.283) 
Large market leverage  n = 1192 n = 787 n = 553 n = 300 n = 244 n = 189 n = 300 
Mean -10.808*** -1.288 7.309 -0.886 1.340 4.817 1.046*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.622) (0.035) (0.800) (0.802) (0.475) (0.000) 
Small market leverage  n = 265 n = 167 n = 127 n = 137 n = 94 n = 79 n = 137 
Mean 8.415** 3.879 3.380 11.500** 4.135 0.503 0.589** 
p-value (0.020) (0.552) (0.753) (0.019) (0.611) (0.967) (0.050) 
Large market leverage - Small market 
leverage 
   
  
  
  
Mean -19.223*** -5.167 3.929 -12.386** 2.796 4.314 0.457 
p-value (0.000) (0.462) (0.728) (0.044) (0.780) (0.740) (0.245) 
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Table VI Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Bond Returns 
Abnormal bond returns around the dates of announced repurchase programs made from 2002 to 2008 are the dependent variables. 
Bond returns are one day, two-day, three-day bond abnormal return for individual bonds in Panels A-C, and one day and three-day 
abnormal bond return averaged by firm in Panel D, respectively. The stock return is the three-day stock CAR defined in Table II. The 
size of the repurchase program is measured in two ways: (1) as the dollar value of the repurchase program divided by the market value 
of firm equity at the beginning of the fiscal year, and (2) as an indicator variable categorizing the repurchase as large (greater than 5.7 
percent of the market value of equity). Other variables are defined in Table II. The models with clustering by announcement year 
report unadjusted R
2
. Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. The 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent 
confidence levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. (n = number of observations) 
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Panel A: Abnormal Bond Returns on Day [0] 
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: Abnormal Bond Returns on Day [0] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 74.042*** 74.042 59.010*** 59.010 143.845*** 143.845 73.945*** 73.945 
 
(4.27) (0.93) (3.52) (0.77) (6.64) (1.19) (4.24) (0.94) 
Log of Market Value -7.210*** -7.210 -6.184*** -6.184 -13.153*** -13.153 -7.170*** -7.170 
 
(-4.96) (-0.83) (-4.21) (-0.74) (-8.52) (-1.09) (-4.92) (-0.82) 
Stock returns 
      
-0.966 -0.966 
       
(-1.62) (-0.88) 
Book-to-market value 47.000*** 47.000* 48.067*** 48.067** 32.834*** 32.834* 47.922*** 47.922* 
 
(5.06) (2.23) (5.21) (2.47) (3.64) (2.40) (5.12) (2.17) 
Size of repurchase program 
        Repurchase size -0.579 -0.579 
  
-1.143** -1.143 -0.558 -0.558 
 
(-1.16) (-0.61) 
  
(-2.30) (-1.30) (-1.11) (-0.57) 
Indicator variable for a large 
repurchase program (> 5.7%) 
  
3.509 3.509 
    
   
(0.81) (0.32) 
    Measures of risk to bondholders 
        Market leverage -0.625*** -0.625 -0.663*** -0.663 
  
-0.612*** -0.612 
 
(-5.52) (-1.24) (-5.86) (-1.35) 
  
(-5.34) (-1.26) 
Volatility of stock return 
    
-81.623*** -81.623 
  
     
(-3.43) (-1.03) 
  Clustering by announcement year 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Number of observations 1454 1454 1454 1454 1448 1448 1447 1447 
Adj. R-squared 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.075 0.066 0.063 0.079 0.078 
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Panel B: Abnormal Bond Returns on Day [0, 1] 
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: Abnormal Bond Returns on Day [0, 1] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 38.817 38.817 39.632 39.632 72.759** 72.759 37.133 37.133 
 
(1.39) (0.53) (1.49) (0.55) (2.16) (0.71) (1.33) (0.56) 
Log of Market Value -2.759 -2.759 -3.057 -3.057 -6.405** -6.405 -2.613 -2.613 
 
(-1.17) (-0.36) (-1.31) (-0.40) (-2.58) (-0.62) (-1.11) (-0.35) 
Stock returns 
      
-2.582*** -2.582* 
       
(-2.77) (-2.04) 
Book-to-market value 40.654*** 40.654* 42.190*** 42.190* 26.348** 26.348 43.031*** 43.031* 
 
(2.96) (2.19) (3.11) (2.36) (1.97) (1.61) (3.12) (2.10) 
Size of repurchase program 
        Repurchase size -0.944 -0.944 
  
-1.686** -1.686 -0.87 -0.872 
 
(-1.25) (-1.39) 
  
(-2.27) (-2.72) (-1.15) (-1.29) 
Indicator variable for a large 
repurchase program (> 5.7%) 
  
-11.370* -11.370* 
    
   
(-1.67) (-2.03) 
    Measures of risk to bondholders 
        Market leverage -0.568*** -0.568 -0.553*** -0.553 
  
-0.519*** -0.519 
 
(-3.36) (-1.29) (-3.28) (-1.24) 
  
(-3.04) (-1.36) 
Volatility of stock return 
    
-12.547 -12.547 
  
     
(-0.38) (-0.20) 
  Clustering by announcement year 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Number of observations 896 896 896 896 891 891 890 890 
Adj. R-squared 0.026 0.022 0.027 0.023 0.014 0.010 0.034 0.032 
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Panel C: Abnormal Bond Returns on Day [-1, 1] 
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: Abnormal Bond Returns On Day [-1, 1] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 58.370* 58.370 63.531** 63.531 40.246 40.246 63.209** 63.209 
 
(1.85) (1.04) (2.11) (1.17) (1.03) (0.50) (2.00) (1.32) 
Log of Market Value -4.930* -4.930 -5.643** -5.643 -3.618 -3.618 -5.129* -5.129 
 
(-1.86) (-0.98) (-2.14) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-0.56) (-1.94) (-1.12) 
Stock returns 
      
-2.362** -2.362 
       
(-2.21) (-1.53) 
Book-to-market value 13.778 13.777 15.320 15.320 11.092 11.092 13.620 13.620 
 
(0.91) (0.83) (1.03) (1.07) (0.76) (0.59) (0.90) (0.93) 
Size of repurchase program 
        Repurchase size -1.205 -1.205 
  
-1.304 -1.304 -1.233 -1.233 
 
(-1.42) (-0.90) 
  
(-1.58) (-0.99) (-1.45) (-1.07) 
Indicator variable for a large 
repurchase program (> 5.7%) 
  
-16.572** -16.572 
    
   
(-2.17) (-1.58) 
    Measures of risk to bondholders 
        Market leverage 0.080 0.080 0.118 0.118 
  
0.102 0.102 
 
(0.44) (0.30) (0.64) (0.48) 
  
(0.55) (0.47) 
Volatility of stock return 
    
43.759 43.759 
  
     
1.07 0.56 
  Clustering by announcement year 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Number of observations 680 680 680 680 674 674 674 674 
Adj. R-squared 0.003 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.007 
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Panel D: Abnormal Bond Returns Averaged by Firm on Day [0] and [-1, 1] 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Abnormal Bond Returns –  
Average by Firm on Day [0] 
Abnormal Bond Returns –  
Average by Firm on Day [-1, 1] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 43.123 35.546 33.355 43.949 61.238 55.849 51.487 69.641 
 
(1.15) (0.95) (0.92) (1.15) (1.23) (1.16) (0.96) (1.37) 
Log of Market Value -3.048 -2.707 -2.467 -3.091 -5.537 -5.260 -4.767 -6.310 
 
(0.90) (-0.78) (-0.74) (-0.88) (-1.18) (-1.12) (-0.99) (-1.27) 
Stock returns 
   
-0.217   
  
-1.676 
    
(-0.31)   
  
(-1.43) 
Book-to-market value -2.332 -1.150 -6.752 -2.362 3.010 3.467 3.537 3.607 
 
(-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.55) (-0.18) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) 
Size of repurchase program 
    
  
   Repurchase size -0.806** 
 
0.911** -0.808** -1.234 
 
-1.157 -1.138 
 
(-2.49) 
 
(-2.84) (-2.46) (-0.93) 
 
(-0.82) (-0.87) 
Indicator variable for large 
repurchase program (> 5.7%) 
 
-1.572 
  
  -13.620 
  
  
(-0.05) 
  
  (-1.76) 
  Measures of risk to bondholders 
    
  
   Market leverage -0.181 -0.210 
 
-0.182 0.148 0.180 
 
0.164 
 
(-0.92) (-1.07) 
 
(-0.90) (0.96) (1.27) 
 
(0.91) 
Volatility of stock return 
  
9.574 
 
  
 
23.431 
 
   
(0.90) 
 
  
 
(0.86) 
 Clustering by announcement year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 435 435 434 433 268 268 266 266 
Adj. R-squared -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 
 
